The scarcity of internal loss databases tends to hinder the use of the advanced approaches for operational risk measurement (AMA) in financial institutions. As there is a greater variety in credit risk modelling, this paper explores the applicability of a modified version of CreditRisk+ to operational loss data. Our adapted model, OpRisk+, works out very satisfying Values-at-Risk at 95% level as compared with estimates drawn from sophisticated AMA models. OpRisk+ proves to be especially worthy in the case of small samples, where more complex methods cannot be applied.
Introduction
Over the past decade, financial institutions have experienced several large operational loss events leading to big banking failures. Memorable examples include the Barings' bankruptcy in 1995, the $691 million trading loss at Allfirst Financial, or the $140 million loss at the Bank of New York due to September 11 th , 2001 . These events, as well as developments such as the growth of e-commerce, changes in banks' risks management or the use of more highly automated technology, have led regulators and the banking industry to recognize the importance of operational risk in shaping the risk profiles of financial institutions.
Reflecting this recognition, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, in its proposal for A New Capital Accord, has incorporated into its proposed capital framework an explicit capital requirement for operational risk, defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. This definition includes legal risk, but not strategic and reputational risks. As for credit risk, the Basel Committee does not believe in a "one-size-fits-all" approach to capital adequacy and proposes three distinct options for the calculation of the capital charge for operational risk: the basic indicator approach, the standardized approach and the advanced measurement approaches (AMA). The use of these approaches of increasing risk sensitivity is determined according to the risk management systems of the banks. The first two methods are a function of gross income, while the advanced methods are based on internal loss data, external loss data, scenario analysis, business environment and internal control factors.
In 2001, the Basel Committee was encouraging two specific AMA methods: (i) the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA) and (ii) an Internal Measurement Approach (IMA) developing a linear relationship between unexpected loss and expected loss to extrapolate credit-risk's internal rating based (IRB) approach to operational risk. However, prior to its 2003 Accord, the Basel Committee dropped formal mention of the IMA leaving the LDA as the only specifically recommended AMA method.
Even though the Basel Accord formally dropped Internal Measurement Approaches in favour of
Value-at-Risk approaches, it is still legitimate to be inspired by modelling approaches for credit risk in order to model the distribution of operational loss data. Indeed, both definitions of risks have similar features, such as their focus on a one-year measurement horizon or their use of an aggregated loss distribution skewed towards zero with a long right-tail. This paper explores the possibility of adapting one of the current proposed industry credit-risk models to perform much of the functionality of an actuarial LDA model. We identified CreditRisk+, the model developed by Credit Suisse, as an actuarial-based model whose characteristics can be adapted to fit the Loss Distribution Approach, which is explicitly mentioned in the Basel II Accord as eligible among the Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA) to estimate risk capital, and has unambiguously emerged as the standard industry practice (see Sahay et al. (2007) or Degen et al. (2007) ) . After some adjustment, we construct a distribution of operational losses through the adapted "OpRisk+" model. As this model calibrates the whole distribution, not only can we retrieve the quantiles of the operational loss distribution, but also an estimate of its expectation, needed for the computation of the economic capital.
Our research is aimed at answering the following question: how would the adaptation of CreditRisk+ model perform compared to sophisticated models such as the approach developed by Chapelle, Crama, Hübner and Peters (2008) (henceforth CCHP) or among others or compared to an extended IMA approach such as Alexander (2003)?
We address the question with an experiment based on generated databases using three different Pareto distributions. We study the behaviour of OpRisk+, together with an alternative characterization that specifically aims at modelling operational losses, when all these models are confronted to either fat, medium or thin tails for the loss distributions. Furthermore, we assess the influence of the number of losses recorded in the database on the quality of the estimation. The knowledge of the true distribution of losses is necessary to assess the quality of the different fitting methods. Had a real data set been used instead of controlled numerical simulations, we would not be able to benchmark the observed results against the true loss distribution and therefore we could not assess the performance of OpRisk+ for different loss generating processes and sample sizes.
We also test our new adapted IRB model against Alexander's existing "lower-bound" improvement to the basic IMA formula to see if our model outperforms. The lower bound is effectively a quantile value from a normal distribution table which allows identification of the unexpected loss if you know the mean and variance of the loss severity distribution and the mean of the frequency distribution. The multiplier is called the "lower-bound" because it will have its lowest value (approximately equal to 3.1) when the mean of the frequency distribution corresponds to a high-frequency type of loss (e.g. more than 100 losses per year).
Our main findings are twofold. First, we note that the precision of OpRisk+ is not satisfactory to estimate the very far end of the loss distribution, such as the Value-at-Risk (VaR) 1 at the 99.9%
confidence level. Yet, our model works out very satisfying quantile estimates, especially for thintailed Pareto-distributions, up to a 95% confidence level for the computation of the VaR. The estimation error is relatively small and stable across distributions. Secondly, the simplicity of our model makes it applicable to "problematic" business lines, that is, with very few occurrences of events, and with very few years of data. Procedures that rely on extreme-value theory, by contrast, are very data-consuming, and yield very poor results when used with small databases.
These findings make the OpRisk+ approach clearly not an effective substitute, but indeed a very useful complement to approaches that specifically target the extreme tail of the loss distribution. In particular, the body of the loss distribution can be safely assessed with our method, while external data, as specifically mentioned in the Accord, can be used to estimate the tail. Being able to simultaneously rely on the body and the tail of the distribution is crucial for the operation risk capital estimation, because one needs the full distribution of losses in order to capture the expected loss that enters the regulatory capital estimate.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the adjustment needed in order to apply
CreditRisk+ model to operational loss data and presents two alternative methods to calibrate a Valueat-Risk on operational loss data (OpVaR). Section 3 describes our database, presents our results and compares them to the other approaches' results. Section 4 concludes.
Alternative Approaches for the Measurement of Operational Risk
This section first presents three alternative ways to calibrate a Value-at-Risk on operational loss data.
The first one represents an adaptation of the CreditRisk+ framework, while the second one proposes an adaptation of the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA) in the context of operational losses with the use of Extreme Value Theory (EVT). Finally, we introduce a lower bound for the Value-at-Risk derived from a model developed by Alexander (2003) .
OpRisk+: Application of CreditRisk+ to Operational Loss Data
CreditRisk+ developed by Credit Suisse First Boston is an actuarial model derived from insurance losses models. It models the default risk of a bond portfolio through the Poisson distribution. Its basic building block is simply the probability of default of a counterparty. In this model, no assumptions are made about the causes of default: an obligor is either in default with a probability P A , or not in default with a probability 1-P A . Although operational losses do not depend on a particular counterparty, this characteristic already simplifies the adaptation of our model, as we do not need to make assumptions on the causes of the loss.
CreditRisk+ determines the distribution of default losses in three steps: the determination of the frequency of defaults, approximated by a standard Poisson distribution, the determination of the severity of the losses and the determination of the distribution of default losses.
The determination of the frequency of events leading to operational losses can be modelled through the Poisson distribution as for the probability of default in CreditRisk+:
( 1) where μ is the average number of defaults per period, and N is a stochastic variable with mean µ, and standard deviation √μ.
CreditRisk+ computes the parameter μ by adding the probability of default of each obligor, supplied, for instance, by rating agencies. However, operational losses do not depend on a particular obligor.
Therefore, instead of being defined as a sum of probabilities of default depending on the characteristics of a counterpart, µ can be interpreted as the average number of loss events of one type occurring in a specific business line during one period.
CreditRisk+ adds the assumption that the mean default rate is itself stochastic in order to take into account the fat right tail of the distribution of defaults. Nevertheless, CCHP (2008) show that, as far as operational risk is concerned, using the Poisson distribution to model the frequency of operational losses does not lead to a substantial measurement error. Hence, we keep on assuming that the number of operational loss events follows a Poisson distribution with a fixed mean µ.
In order to perform its calculations, CreditRisk+ proposes to express the exposure (here, the losses) in a unit amount of exposure L2. The key step is then to round up each exposure size to the nearest whole number, in order to reduce the number of possible values and to distribute them into different bands. Each band is characterized by an average exposure, νj and an expected loss, εj, equal to the sum of the expected losses of all the obligors belonging to the band. Table 1 shows an example of this procedure.
[ 
where ε j is the expected loss in band j, ν j is the common exposure in band j, and μ j is the expected number of defaults in band j.
As the operational losses do not depend on a particular transaction, we slightly modify the definition of these variables. The aim is to calculate the expected aggregate loss. We will therefore keep the definition of εj unchanged. However, as noted earlier, μ j is not an aggregate expected number of defaults anymore but simply the (observed) average number of operational loss events occurring in one year. Consequently, in order to satisfy equation (2), ν j must be defined as the average loss amount per event for band j. The following table illustrates the reprocessing of the data:
Each band is viewed as a portfolio of exposures by itself. Because some defaults lead to larger losses than others through the variation in exposure amounts, the loss given default involves a second element of randomness, which is mathematically described through its probability generating function. Thus, let G(z) be the probability generating function for losses expressed in multiples of the unit L of exposure:
As the number of defaults follows a Poisson distribution, this is equal to:
As far as operational losses are concerned, a band can no more be considered as a portfolio but will simply be seen as a category of loss size. This also simplifies the model, as we do not distinguish exposure and expected loss anymore. For credit losses, exposures are first sorted, and then the expected loss is calculated, by multiplying the exposures by their probability of default. As far as operational losses are concerned, the loss amounts are directly sorted by size. Consequently, the second element of randomness is not necessary anymore. This has no consequences on the following results except simplifying the model.
Whereas CreditRisk+ assumed the exposures in the portfolio to be independent, OpRisk+ will assume the independence of the different loss amounts. Thanks to this assumption, the probability generating function for losses of one type for a specific business line is given by the product of the probability generating function for each band:
Finally, the loss distribution of the entire portfolio is given by:
Note that this equation allows only computing the probability of losses and size 0, L, 2L and so on.
This probability of loss of nL will further be denoted A n.
Then, under the simplified assumption of fixed default rates, Credit Suisse has developed the following recursive equation 3 :
where Therefore, the probability of having a loss of size resp. 0, 1L and 2L is resp. 2.06.10 , and so on.
From there, you can re-construct the distribution of the loss of size nL.
The procedure can be summarized as follows:
2. Divide the losses of the available database by L and round up these numbers.
band, equal to the observed number of losses per band multiplied by the average loss amount per band, equal to j.
4. Compute the probability of zero losses equal to A 0 = e -µ , where µ is the total number of losses observed per period.
5. For each band j = 1 to n, compute the probability of losses of size n by using equation (7).
6. Cumulate the probabilities in order to find the OpVaR 99.9 .
7. Repeat the procedure for each year of data.
The Loss Distribution Approach adapted to Operational Risk
Among the Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA) developed over the recent years to model operational risk, the most common one is the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA), which is derived from actuarial techniques (see Frachot, Georges and Roncalli, 2001 for an introduction).
By means of convolution, this technique derives the aggregated loss distribution (ALD) through the combination of the frequency distribution of loss events and the severity distribution of a loss given The latter underline that, in front of an actual database of internal operational losses, mixing two distributions fit more adequately the empirical severity distribution than a single distribution.
Therefore, they divide the sample into two parts: a first one with losses below a selected threshold, considered as the "normal" losses, and a second one, including the "large" losses. To model the "normal" losses, CCHP compare several classic continuous distributions such as gamma, lognormal or Pareto.
To take extreme and very rare losses into account (i.e. the "large" losses), the authors apply the 
Comparison with a lower bound
The basic formula of the Internal Measurement Approach (IMA) included in the Advanced Measurement Approaches of Basel II is:
EL UL (8) where UL = unexpected loss, determining the operational risk requirement 9 , and is a multiplier.
Gamma factors are not easy to evaluate as no indication of their possible range has been given by the Basel Committee. Therefore, Alexander (2003) suggests that instead of writing the unexpected loss as a multiple (γ) of expected loss, one writes unexpected loss as a multiple (Φ) of the loss standard deviation. Using the definition of the expected loss, she gets the expression for Φ:
The advantages of this parameter are that it can be easily calibrated and that it has a lower bound.
The basic IMA formula is based on the binomial loss frequency distribution, with no variability in loss severity. For very high-frequency risks, Alexander notes that the normal distribution could be used as an approximation of the binomial loss distribution, providing for Φ a lower bound equal to 3.1 (as can be found from standard normal tables when the number of losses goes to infinity). She also suggests that the Poisson distribution should be preferred to the binomial as the number of transactions is generally difficult to quantify.
Alexander (2003) also shows that Φ, as a function of the parameter of the Poisson distribution, must be in a fairly narrow range: from about 3.2 for medium-to high frequency risks (20 to 100 loss events per year) to about 3.9 for low frequency risks (one loss event every one or two years) and only above 4 for very rare events that may happen only once every five years or so. Table 3 illustrates the wide range for the gammas by opposition to the narrow range of the phi's values.
[ Then, assuming the loss severity to be random, i.e. with mean µ L and standard deviation σ L , and independent of the loss frequency, Alexander writes the Φ parameter as: (10) Where λ is the average number of losses.
For σ L > 0, this formula produces slightly lower Φ than with no severity uncertainty, but it is still bounded below by the value 3.1.
For a comparison purpose, we will use the following value for the lower bound of the needed OpVaR 99.9 , derived from equation (10) in which we replaced Φ by 3.1 (asymptotic value for the ratio of the difference between the 99 th quantile and the parameter of the Poisson distribution to its standard deviation) :
Our model should therefore produce operational economic capital at least equal or higher than this lower bound.
An Experiment on Simulated Losses

Data
OpRisk+ makes the traditional statistical tests impossible, as it uses no parametrical form but a purely numerical procedure. Therefore, in order to perform tests of the calibrating performance of OpRisk+ on any distribution of loss severity, we simulate databases to obtain an exhaustive picture of the capabilities of the approach, that is, on the basis of three different kinds of distributions: a heavy-tail, a medium-tail and a thin-tail Pareto distribution. Indeed, and de Fontnouvelle and Rosengren (2004) have shown that loss data for most business lines and event types may be well modelled by a Pareto-type distribution.
A Pareto distribution is a right-skewed distribution parameterized by two quantities: a minimum possible value or location parameter, x m , and a tail index or shape parameter, ξ. Therefore, if X is a random variable with a Pareto distribution, the probability that X is greater than some number x is given by:
for all x ≥ x m. , and for x m and k= 1/ξ >0.
The parameters of our distributions are Pareto(100;0.3), Pareto(100;0.5) and Pareto(100;0.7): the larger the value of the tail index, the fatter the tail of the distribution. The choice of these functions has been found to be reasonable with a sample of real data obtained from a large European institution.
We ran three simulations: one for the thin-tailed Pareto severity distribution case, one for the mediumtailed Pareto severity distribution case and one for the fat-tailed Pareto severity distribution case. For each of these cases, we simulated two sets of 1000 years of 20 and respectively 50 operational losses and two sets of 100 10 series of 200 losses and 300, respectively. For each of the 6600 simulated years (3 x 2 x 1100), the aggregated loss distribution has been computed with the algorithm described in Section 2.2. Table 4 gives the characteristics of each of the twelve databases (each thus comprising 1000 or 100 simulated aggregate loss distributions) constructed in order to implement OpRisk+. For each series of operational losses we computed the expected loss, that is, the mean loss multiplied by the number of losses. The five last lines present the mean, standard deviation, median, maximum and minimum of these expected losses.
[ These results clearly show that data generated with a thin-tailed Pareto-distribution exhibit characteristics that make the samples quite reliable. The mean loss is very close to its theoretical level even for 20 draws. Furthermore, we observe a standard deviation of aggregate loss that is very limited, from less than 10% of the average for N=20 to less than 3% for N=200. The median loss is also close to the theoretical value. For a tail index of 0.5 (medium-tailed), the mean loss still stays close to the theoretical value but the standard deviation increases. Thus, we can start to question the stability of the loss estimate.
When the tail index increases, all these nice properties collapse. The mean aggregate loss becomes systematically lower than the theoretical mean, and this effect aggravates when one takes a lower number of simulations (100 drawings) with a larger sample. The standard deviation and range become extremely large, making inference based on a given set of loss observations extremely adventurous.
Application of OpRisk+
To apply OpRisk+ to these data, the first step consists of computing A 0 = e -μ , where μ is the average number of loss events. For instance, for N=200, this gives the following value:
. Then, in order to assess the loss distribution of the entire population of operational risk events, we use the recursive equation (7) to compute A 1 , A 2 etc.
Once the different probabilities A n for the different sizes of losses are computed, we can plot the aggregated loss distribution as illustrated in Figure 1 .
With this information, we can compute the different Operational Values-at-Risk (OpVaR). This is done by calculating the cumulated probabilities for each amount of loss. The loss for which the cumulated probability is equal to p% gives us the OpVaR at percentile p. Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 compares the OpVaRs obtained using OpRisk+ with the simulated data for the small databases. The first column represent the average observed quantiles of the aggregated distribution when simulating 25000 years with a Poisson(mu) distribution for the frequency and a Pareto(100, ξ.) for the severity. The tables also gives the minimum, maximum and standard deviation of the 100(0) OpVaRs produced by OpRisk+.
The average values for the different OpVaRs are given in
Panel A of Table 5 shows that OpRisk+ achieves very satisfactory OpVaRs for the Pareto-distribution with thin tail. The mean OpVaRs obtained for both the samples of 20 and 50 observations stays within a 4% distance from the true value. Even at the level of 99.9% required by Basel II, the OpRisk+ values stay within a very narrow range, while the standard deviation of the estimates is kept within 10% around the good value.
[TABLE 5]
The results obtained with the OpRisk+ procedure with medium and fat tails tend to deteriorate, which is actually not surprising as the adaptation of the credit risk model strictly uses observed data and does necessarily underestimate the fatness of the tails. However, we still have very good estimation for OpVaR 95. It mismatches the true 95% quantile by 2% to 7% for the medium and fat tailed Paretodistribution, while the standard deviation tends -naturally -to increase very fast.
The bad news is that the procedure alone is not sufficient to provide the OpVaR 99.9 required by Basel II. It severely underestimates the true quantile, even though this true value is included in the range of the observed values of the loss estimates. Table 6 , Panel A already delivers some rather surprising results. The OpRisk+ procedure seems to overestimates the true operational risk exposure for all confidence levels; this effect aggravates for a high number of losses in the database. This phenomenon is probably due to an intervalling effect, where losses belonging to a given band are given the value of the band. Given that extreme losses are likely to occur in the lower part of the band, as the distribution is characterized by a thin tail Paretodistribution, taking the upper bound limit value for aggregation seems to deteriorate the estimation, making it too conservative. Nevertheless, the bias is almost constant in relative terms, indicating that its seriousness does not aggravate as the estimation gets far in the tail of the distribution. Sub-section 5.4. will go further in this assumption.
This intervalling phenomenon explains the behaviour of the estimation for larger values of the tail index. In Panel B, the adapted credit risk model still overestimates the distribution of losses up to a confidence level of 99%, but then does not capture to distribution at the extreme end of the tail (99.9%). In Panel C, the underestimation starts earlier, around the 90% percentile of the distribution.
The procedure, using only observed data, is still totally unable to capture the fat tailedness of the distribution of aggregated losses.
Nevertheless, from panels B and C altogether, the performance of OpRisk+ still stays honourable when the confidence level of 95% is adopted. The standard deviation of the estimates also remains within 15% (with the tail index of 0.5) and 30% of the mean (with a tail index of 0.7), which is fairly large but mostly driven by large outliers as witnessed in the last column of each panel.
A correct mean estimate of the OpVaR 95 would apply to a tail index between 0.5 and 0.7, which corresponds to a distribution with a fairly large tail index. Only when the tail of the Pareto-distribution is actually thin, one observes that the intervalling effect induces a large discrepancy between the theoretical and observed values.
It remains to be mentioned that the good application of OpRisk+ does not depend on the number of observed losses as it only affects the first term of the recurrence, namely A 0 .
Comparison with the CCHP approach and the Lower-Bound of Alexander.
These results, if their economic and statistical significance have to be assessed, have to be compared with a method that aims at specifically addressing the issue of operational losses in the Advanced Measurement Approaches setup. We choose the CCHP approach, which is by definition more sensitive to extreme events than OpRisk+, but has the drawback of requiring a large number of events to properly derive the severity distributions of "normal" and "large" losses. From the graphs in Figure 2 , we can see that for most databases, OpRisk+ is working out a capital requirement higher than the lower bound, but smaller than the CCHP approach. This last result could be expected as CCHP is more sensitive to extreme events. We will discuss the fact that the database with 300 observations shows higher OpVaRs for OpRisk+ than CCHP in the last sub-section.
However, we can already conclude that our model is more risk sensitive than a simple IMA approach.
Considering the thin tailed Pareto-distribution in Panel A, we can observe that OpRisk+ produces the best estimations for the small database. Indeed, those are very close to the theoretical OpVaRs for all confidence level. However, for the large database, it is producing too cautious (large) OpVaRs. The comparison with other methods sheds new light on the results obtained with Panel A of Table 6: OpRisk+ overestimates the true VaR, but the CCHP model, especially dedicated to the measurement of operational risk, does even worse. Actually, Alexander's (2003) lower bound, also using observed data but not suffering from an intervalling effect, works out very satisfactory results when the standard deviation of loss is a good proxy of the variability of the distribution.
For the medium and fat tailed Pareto-distributions, neither of the models is sensitive enough for OpVaRs of 99% and more. However, as far as the small databases are concerned, it is interesting to note that OpRisk+ is producing the best estimations for OpVaR 95 . 
Comparison with OpRisk+ taking an average value of loss for each band.
As shown above, taking the upper bound limit value for aggregation as described in the CreditRisk+ model tends to overestimate the true operational risk exposure for all confidence levels; especially with larger databases. A solution could be to take the average value of losses for each band 11 . Table 7 displays the results of the simulations when a relatively large sample size is used.
Panel A of Table 7 shows that OpRisk+ achieves very good results for the Pareto-distribution characterized by a thin tail when using an average value for each band ("round" column). The OpVaR values obtained for the sample of 200 observations is very close from the theoretical value, whereas it stays within a 6% range from the "true" value with a 300 observations sample, including at the Basel II level of 99.9%.
When the loss Pareto-distributions are medium-tailed, the results obtained with the OpRisk+ procedure with the databases are very good for quantiles up to 95% but deteriorate for more sensitive OpVaRs. OpRisk+ is still totally unable to capture the tailedness of the distribution of aggregated losses for very high confidence interval, such as the Basel II requirement.
[ Table 8 compares the two methods when applied to small databases of 20 and 50 observations. In such cases, OpRisk+ provides better results with the "round up" solution than with the "round" one. This bias could be due to the fact that with the second method we tend to loose the "extreme value theory" aspect of the model. Small databases tend indeed to lack extreme losses and taking the upper bound limit value for the aggregation makes the resulting distribution's tail fatter.
[ TABLE 8] 
Conclusions
This paper introduces a structural operational risk model, named OpRisk+, that has been inspired from the well known credit risk model, CreditRisk+, which had characteristics transposable to the operational risk modelling.
In a simulations setup, we work out aggregated loss distributions and operational Value-at-Risks (OpVaR) corresponding to the confidence level required by Basel II. The performance of our model is assessed by comparing our results to theoretical OpVaRs, to a lower bound issued from a simpler approach, that is, the IMA approach of Alexander (2003) , and to a more sophisticated approach using two distributions in order to model the severity distributions of "normal" and "extreme" losses proposed in Chapelle et al. (2008) , or "CCHP" approach.
The results show that OpRisk+ produces higher OpVaRs than the lower bound of Alexander (2003) , but that it is not receptive enough to extreme events. On the other hand, our goal is not to produce an adequate economic capital, but to try to propose a first solution to the lack of operational risk models.
Besides, whereas the CCHP approach has better sensitivity to very extreme losses, the simplicity of OpRisk+ gives the model the advantage of requiring no large database in order to be implemented.
Specifically, we view the value-added of the OpRisk+ procedure as twofold. Firstly, it produces average estimates of operational risk exposures that are very satisfactory at the 95% level, which makes it a very useful complement to approaches that specifically target the extreme tail of the loss distribution. Indeed, even though the performance of OpRisk+ is clearly not sufficient for the measurement of unexpected operational losses as defined by the Basel II Accord (the VaR should be measured with a 99.9% confidence level), it could be thought of as a sound basis for the measurement of the body of losses; another more appropriate method must relay OpRisk+ for the measurement of the far end of the distribution.
Secondly, despite the fact that we can not conclude that OpRisk+ is an adequate model to quantify the economic capital associated to the bank's operational risk in the LDA approach, its applicability to approximate the loss distribution with small databases is proven. Even for such a small database as one comprising 20 observations, the estimation could make it attractive as a complement to more sophisticated approaches requiring large numbers of data per period. The fit is almost perfect when the Pareto-distribution has a thin tail, and the OpVaR 95 is the closest among the three specifications tested when the tail gets fatter.
Of course, this approach is still subject to refinements, and could be improved in many ways. Indeed, internal data rarely includes very extreme events (banks suffering those losses probably would no more be there to tell us), whereas the last percentiles are very sensitive to the presence of those events.
The problem would therefore be to determine which weight to place on the internal data and on the external ones. From our study, we could imagine that fitting a distribution calibrated with external data or relying on EVT beyond the 95% percentile would justify the simultaneous use of OpRisk+ preferably to other models. This advantage can prove to be crucial for business lines or event types where very few internal observations are available, and thus where most approaches such as the CCHP would be powerless.
Notes
1 The Value-at-Risk (VaR) is the amount that losses will likely not exceed, within a predefined confidence level and over a given time-period. 2 CreditRisk+'s authors argue that the exact amount of each loss cannot be critical in the determination of the global risk.
3 See Appendix.
4 Several unit amounts were tested and did not lead to significantly different results. The size of the unit amount should especially be chosen according to the number of losses: the bigger the number of losses in the database, the bigger the unit amount, in order to lighten the computations. Number of simulated years 1000 1000 100 100 CreditRisk+ mathematically describes the random effect of the severity distribution through its probability generating function G(Z):
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Comparing this definition with the Taylor series expansion for G(z), the probability of a loss of n x L, An, is given by:
In CreditRisk+, G(Z) is given in closed form by :
Therefore, using Leibniz formula we have: 
